Safety Briefing

November 2014

Resourcing Solutions

Welcome to Resourcing Solutions's November 2014 safety briefing

In this edition:

- Information about our on call management system
- Worksafe (refusal to work) procedures
- PPE
- Life Saving Rules
- Important updates from Network Rail and clients

Action required

After reading this briefing, you are required to respond. Please see details of how to do this at the end of the briefing.

On Call Management Service

What is it?

Resourcing Solutions operates a 24 hour on call management service. Our team of On Call Managers record contractor performance, take reports of all accidents and incidents on site, and deal with enquiries and complaints.

What should be reported?

You must report the following to the On Call Manager:

- If you will not be attending work (absenteeism) or will be late attending site
- If you will be leaving site early
- If you are required by the client to exceed your planned hours (risk assessment required)
- If you have an accident or incident (accident, incident, first aid and RIDDOR)
- If you experience an environmental accident or incident
- If your health, safety and welfare has been compromised (Worksafe policy)
- If you are expected to work alone (work alone procedure)
- If you have taken any medication (prescribed or non-prescribed)
- If you think a worker is under the influence of alcohol or drugs
- If you have concerns regarding fellow workers' quality or performance on site

24 hour On Call Manager: 07786 265531

Please note:

If at any time you are unable to attend site you must call the number above. Please do not substitute with another worker without contacting Resourcing Solutions (RSL). Any worker turning up to site that has not been sent by RSL will be turned away.

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

Worksafe (refusal to work) procedures

Any worker may refuse to work on the grounds of health and safety if they feel the health, safety and welfare of themselves, others, including the public has been compromised to such an extent that the risk of performing the task is too high.

If your health, safety and welfare has been compromised, you must:

- Stop work immediately
- Ensure all precautions are taken to prevent injury, ill-health or damage to property
- Escalate the issue to an appropriate client representative (person in charge)
- Escalate the issue to the On Call Manager

All workers who use the Worksafe procedure will not be subject to disciplinary action, unless it is deemed to have been used incorrectly. If the worker is uncomfortable escalating their concern to a client representative, then the On Call Manager must be informed. The worker may remain anonymous throughout the entire process if they wish. If the worker is uncomfortable escalating their concern to the On Call Manager, then CIRAS (Confidential Incident Reporting and Analysis Systems for the UK Rail Industry) may be contacted. CIRAS is an alternative way to report safety concerns that you feel unable to report through company safety channels.

Report safety concerns to:
On Call Manager on 07786 265531 or CIRAS Freephone-0800 4 101 101

Personal Protective Equipment

Resourcing Solutions operates a Personal Protective Equipment policy. When or near Network Rail's controlled infrastructure you must wear basic PPE which consists of:

- Head protection (hard hat)
- Goggles
- Foot protection
- Hand protection
- High visibility clothing (vest, jacket & trousers)

Additional PPE will be issued subject to client requirements or by a risk assessment.

Exemptions

- Male members of the Sikh religion are exempt from wearing a safety helmet, providing that a turban is worn
- Personnel driving or operating machines from within a covered cab will be exempt from wearing their safety helmet
- Anyone working in water, mud or snow will be exempt from wearing standard footwear with ankle support and will be provided with wellington boots with steel toe-caps and mid-sole protection

Each contractor must:

- Wear PPE as required by legislation or the client
- Inform the On Call Manager of a lack of PPE or damaged/deteriorated PPE
- Exercise the Worksafe procedure if PPE is non-existent, does not fit or is considered inadequate
- Use, clean and store PPE effectively and in line with all health and safety information
- Report all PPE that is ill fitting
- Not modify, interfere or misuse PPE
- Co-operate with PPE audits performed by Resourcing Solutions's representatives

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NetworkRail

High Speed News Bulletin

31st October 2014 *Bulletin 302*

News Bulletin – SR10 York Way Track Access.

Please be aware that Thameslink Canal Tunnels have made some modest changes to our access arrangements at the rear or SR10 York Way compound. This was essential for them to deliver the Canal Tunnels works. Gate 465A is now relocated slightly to the left and gives access to the stairs up to the Up CTRL. Further along the path is a new gate which will give access to the walkway along to the underpass of LT1 Portal going through to the Down CTRL.

A new sign is being ordered and will be in place on the new gate soon, until, if you require access through the new gate, then please book onto the operational railway using gate 465A as per the previous arrangement. Please see photograph below.

Produced by Safety & Assurance Department
Singlewell Infrastructure Maintenance Depot
Henhurst Road, Cobham, Gravesend
Kent, DA12 3AN

Distribution Date: 31/10/2014

everyone home safe every day

NetworkRail

Network Rail
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Milton Keynes
MK9 1EN

3 November 2014

No: NRS 341

Network Rail Safety Bulletin

Watford Tunnel – Train Collision with location case door

For the attention of: all railway staff working trackside

Background: On 26 October 2014, a London Midland train travelling south through Watford Tunnel came into contact with the door of a signalling location case. The impact of the location case door on the train caused damage to the carriage including smashing the train door window.

The location case had recently been installed on the tunnel wall.

Investigations have commenced and involve: RAIB, ORR, Network Rail, the Principal Contractor and London Midland.

Location case with door missing

Damage to London Midland train

While we are investigating the causes of the accident, please take the time to consider the following and discuss in your teams:

- When working on location cases how do you positively confirm that the doors are closed and secured on every occasion before leaving the worksite?
- Are there other pieces of equipment or materials that you work with that may pose a similar risk? How do you make sure these are only ever left in a safe condition?

Issued by: Network Rail. For further details contact: Andy Dunnett – Head of S&SD IP Signalling

Together we can

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4 November 2014

No: NRS 342

Network Rail Safety Bulletin

Access to signalling power supply systems operating between 175V ac and 650V ac

For the attention of: All staff working with signalling power supply systems

Never assume equipment is isolated – always test before touch.

Never undertake any job unless you have been trained and assessed as competent.

Work must always be carried out with the supply dead, unless it is unreasonable to work dead, and a suitable risk assessment has been carried out to show that it is reasonable to work live.

The maximum safe working voltage is 60V ac & 120V dc

Any conductor energised at or below these voltages is considered to be safe.

Any conductor energised above these voltages must be considered live and wherever possible isolated prior to work. If this is not possible then suitable precautions must be taken before any work is carried out on energised conductors. For further information, please refer to Safety Bulletin 278 dated 26 April 2013.

If you have to work on or near a conductor (closer than 300 mm) between 175V ac and 650 V ac where isolation is not possible, then you must use live working procedures. Between 60V ac and 175V ac, a local risk assessment must be completed to determine if live working procedures are required.

External metalwork, for example the case of a Functional Supply Point (FSP) and metal covers of equipment within the FSP, should not normally be live. The test before touch lifesaving rule still applies. If testing shows any voltage to be above 60V ac you should first consider isolation. Live working must only be applied where isolation is not possible.

If you are required to work on equipment live above the maximum safe working voltage, then you must be competent in live working.

Where live working is necessary, you must use insulated gloves and you can choose between the thinner Class 00, or Class 0 gloves.

For further advice, contact Robert Wilson, Principal Engineer,
robert.wilson2@networkrail.co.uk or 07885 430 847

Issued by Richard Stainton, Professional Head, Electrical Power and Jeremy Morling, Professional Head, Signals

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30 October 2014

No: NRS 340

Network Rail Safety Bulletin

Deployment of Lookout Operated Warning Systems (LOWS)

For the attention of: All Network Rail staff and contractors

Background:

There have been recent incidents at Market Harborough, Hest Bank and Thatcham where Network Rail staff and contractors have not been adequately protected by the safe system of work involving Lookout Operated Warning System (LOWS). No one has been injured in any of the reported incidents, but workers had to move out of the path of trains with insufficient warning time. In each case, subsequent analysis of the LOWS data-logger has confirmed the equipment to be operating as designed.

Forward-facing image still from the recent near miss at Hest Bank, LNW

While we are investigating the causes of the incidents, please take the time to consider the following and discuss in your teams:

- Is every effort made during **planning** to undertake work in available possessions, line blockages, behind fences / barriers or separated by distance?
- How can you be certain there is **no train** between the lookout and worksite when work (re)starts?
- Have you encountered **potential distractions** when on site from the environment such as from members of the public, station operations or a noisy environment such as a level crossing? What would you do to make the arrangements safe in these circumstances?
- Are LOWS lookout duties planned to facilitate breaks at least every **two hours** as recommended in the lookout e-learning?
- When acting as lookout, if you feel your **concentration** has reduced do you send a "train on" warning and agree a suitable break with the LOWS Controller?

For further information contact your local 'LOWS Champion/Advisor' who will be able to clarify information in more detail.

Issued by Network Rail. For further details contact: Ty Qureshi, Safety Improvement Specialist

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6 November 2014

No: NRS 343

Network Rail Safety Bulletin

Safe use of Ironmen

For the attention of: All staff involved in the planning, operation and maintenance of Ironmen

Background:

On 1 November 2014 a group of trackworkers were moving 2 x 52ft pieces of rail for approximately a mile and a quarter on the line between Pantyffynnon Jcn and Gwaun-cae-Gurwen in Wales using two pairs of Ironmen.

The Ironmen were being operated down a gradient which was up to 1 in 40, with the load for each pair being just short of 1 tonne. The rail head was contaminated with leaves and it was raining heavily at the time.

Both pairs of Ironmen experienced difficulties during braking; this resulted in them gaining speed to the point the operators could no longer control them. One of the operators of the first pair received a graze injury and another suffered from shock.

The first pair ran away for approximately 5 miles crossing 5 level crossings including narrowly avoiding a team working on the first. The second pair was brought to a halt at the first level crossing. Subsequent inspection of the brakes has shown them to be worn.

Immediate action required:

- Before further use, all Ironmen shall have additional maintenance carried out by the maintainer. The maintenance shall follow the full maintenance requirements for brakes contained in the user guide or handbook.
- Ironmen shall not be used on gradients greater than **1 in 150** until further notice.
- Staff are reminded that a brake test is required at the start of every shift (rotational tests) and once mounted on rail (prior to loading).
- The requirements for planning, operating and maintaining Ironmen including the number of staff required to control the equipment based on the load are contained within NR/PLANT/0200/modules P501, P514 and P702 *Infrastructure Plant Manual.*

Issued by: Paul Conway, Professional Head [Plant and T&RS] paul.conway@networkrail.co.uk

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Issued by Richard Stainton, Professional Head, Electrical Power and Jeremy Morling, Professional Head, Signals

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Shared Learning from a Formal Investigation

Date: 24 October 2014
Issued By: Corporate Investigation Manager, Milton Keynes, MK9 1EN

Document ref: NRL14/04
Title: Designing and installing chemical anchors for post-drilled fixings
For further information contact Colin Sims (STE) or Jason Johnston (IP)

Photograph of failed stud

Overview of Event

On 23 September 2011, Balcombe Tunnel on the London to Brighton Main Line was closed due to the partial failure of one of the water catchment trays fixed to the upper part of the tunnel lining. Three consecutive support beams had become detached from the tunnel lining at one end and the metal structure had sagged above the Up line; no trains had been struck when rail traffic was suspended. The failure was investigated and remedial works installed before reopening to rail traffic.

The industry and RAIB investigation found a large number of contributory issues.

This Shared Learning highlights the importance of:

- specifying appropriate fixings for the location and usage, and
- following correct design and installation processes.

Guidance Available

Since the incident, the British Standards Institution (BSI) has issued 'BS 8539:2012 Code of practice for the selection and installation of post-installed anchors in concrete and masonry'. BS 8539 applies to all fixings drilled into concrete or masonry (i.e. bricks, blocks or stones), and not just in tunnels.

BS 8539, Section 4, contains clearly defined roles and responsibilities for: Manufacturer/supplier; Designer; Specifier; Contractor; Installer; Supervisor and Tester. Each needs to be competent.

- Any person who at any time changes a specification without notifying the original specifier is deemed to have taken on the role and responsibilities of the specifier (this includes changes made on site).

Underlying Causes:

Anchor Selection and Design
The design of the connection between the studs and tunnel lining was inadequate given the actions on the structure and the condition of the substrate that the anchors were embedded in.

The resin was probably selected using inadequate technical data and, with no on-site testing having taken place during the design phase, was not compatible with the tunnel brickwork. The resin that was ultimately selected may have been softened by water percolating through the brickwork; and resin shrinkage may have reduced the bond between studs, resin and brickwork.

Quality Control
It is probable that insufficient resin was placed round the studs during installation in 1998/9.

The extent of supervision and quality control of the site work was unclear due to the lack of records, and the method of testing specified by the designer did not reveal any shortcomings in the stud installation process.

There was no evidence that NR and its designers were aware of published reports which indicated a problem with the durability of polyester resin in damp conditions.

Key Message: The risk of functional failure of post-installed anchors should be addressed in Building and Civil Engineering Assurance forms (as prescribed in NR/L2/CIV/003) and accompanying design / project risk records. That process must also identify appropriate mitigation measures which should include implementing the requirements of BS 8539:2012 when selecting, designing and installing post-installed anchors in masonry and concrete.

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Action required

Once you are confident with the content of this briefing, please respond that you have read it by emailing compliance@resourcing-solutions.com

Thank you.

Together we can

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